EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE IN TIMES OF UNCERTAINTY

An intertemporal comparison of democracies: Ancient Athens, modern Greece and the EU

Nicholas Kyriazis
Professor. Dr., Department of Economics, University of Thessaly

Emmanouil M.L. Economou
Adjunct Lecturer, Department of Economics, University of Thessaly

1. Introduction

In the present essay we undertake an intertemporal comparison between three states, that of ancient Athens. In Classical times and two modern ones, Greece and the European Union, focusing on four criteria. The criteria are isonomia, (equality before the law) isegoria (the right to propose policy measures), isokrateia (all positions of the state open to all citizens without restriction) and logodosia, (procedural accountability).

As we will make clear, the concept of democracy which we use goes beyond the criterion of general elections that are held at regular intervals. Elections, for example, were held in 1936 and 1938 in Germany, but few, we hope, would characterize Nazi Germany as a democracy. Elections were held in June 2018 in Turkey, but most would not describe modern Turkey, still under “special” (martial) law, as a full democracy. Elections were held in Hungary and Poland, but the EU has grave misgivings as to the state of democracy in these countries (especially after their attempt against freedom of the press and the independence of the courts) threating Hungary and Poland with the use (for the first time ever) of article 7 of the Lisbon Treaty. This, if adopted (by unanimity) leads to the loss of the right of vote of a country in the Council’s of Ministers.

What we also hope to make clear is that the concept of democracy in ancient Greece and some modern states is different from that practiced in other countries. So, the first issue is, what is a democracy? Abraham Lincoln

provided an answer in his famed Gettysburg Address as “government from the people, by the people, for the people”. The “from” is interpreted as the election, by the citizens, of their representatives to form a government. The “for” is interpreted as being for the benefit, or welfare of the people, which, however, raises certain problems: The first of these concerns the definition of this benefit which raises an array of further issues, such as: Can we aggregate individual preferences in order to construct an “artificial” social welfare function, which governments should strive to maximize?

Do governments really try to maximize a social welfare function (assuming it exists) or do they follow their own preferences? This is the well-known principal agent problem, where the agent, in this case, the government, follows his own agenda for personal benefit, opens the possibility for corruption, etc. and not the “instructions” or will of the principal benefit, in this case the citizens-voters. But even if we leave these problems aside for the moment, what does the phrase “by the people” mean? Does “by” imply a transfer of power from the people to their representatives in Parliament, in such a way that the representatives become the people? This could be a justification of representative democracy. As we will see, ancient democrats, and some modern ones, would reject it as unacceptable.

Our essay is organized as follows: In the next section we illustrate briefly the institutional set up of the three cases. Then, we apply the criteria and proceed to an analysis of the degree of democratization, followed by our conclusions and proposals for the two modern cases.

2. Ancient Athens, modern Greece and the EU

Ancient Athens

Cleisthenes introduced direct democracy in Athens in 510-507 BCE, which was gradually expanded by the reforms of Ephialtes and culminated in the improvements of Pericles, under whom all Athenian citizens had the same rights, independent of wealth or any other criterion. They could elect and be elected by lot for all positions of the state’s administration and the courts, except for those requiring “specialist” knowledge, such as the ten strategoi (generals) and the tamiai (finance ministers) during the second half of the 4th century. They could also introduce proposals to the supreme decision-making body, the Ecclesia (Assembly), which met at least 40 days per year and decided on all issues concerning war, peace, treaties, and financial matters. Examples of such decisions are Themistocles’ Naval

Decree of 483/2 BCE and monetary issues (e.g, Nicophon’s Decree of 376/5 BCE regarding the circulation of parallel currencies (to Athenian currency) and taking out loans in case of need from the treasuries of the gods, etc..

The Boule of 500 (Council) was a preparatory body that set the agenda for the Assembly’s meetings, and 50 members out of the 500 each month (the Athenian calendar had ten months, corresponding to the ten Athenian tribes) functioned as the «government» of Athens in a rotating basis with the rest of 50 members of each tribe. This is an important correction tobe made! They also had some administrative and supervisory functions, as for example, meeting foreign ambassadors, providing for the introduction of stelai (inscribed stones) with various Decrees that were displayed in public view in the Agora (marketplace), in an early manifestation of “open government”. The popular courts (Heliaia) consisted of 6,000 jury members who were chosen by lot and sat in smaller bodies judging every kind of dispute except homicides cases which were judged by the Areios Pagos, a pre-existing aristocratic body of justice.

The Athenian democracy was not static, but evolutionary, both in the sense of its continuously adopting Laws and Decrees by the Assembly, but also in introducing, during the 4th century, a system of checks and balances, the most important being graphe paramonon, under which all new proposals had to be examined ex-ante so as to make sure that they were not “anti-constitutional”, .

Modern Greece

Like almost all modern states, Greece has had a constitution since 1844, which has been amended often. Greece is a purely representative democracy with a President as its nominal head (but with few real responsibilities), a prime minister as head of government, a Parliament and an “independent” judiciary, with the two Supreme Courts, the Areios Pagos and the Supreme Administration Court. However, it has no Constitutional Court as exists in other democracies such as the USA, Germany, France, etc. As a member of the European

Union and Economic and Monetary Union, Greece must follow common European policies, such as the monetary policy set by the European Central Bank, etc.

The European Union (EU)

The European Union was introduced in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome and was known at that time as the European Common Market. It has undergone many changes, culminating in today’s EU of 27 members (after Brexit) and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) of 19 members. One issue is how to characterize the EU. The term European Union would indicate, in analogy to other Unions both older and modern, (e.g., the USA, Bundesrepublic Deutschland, the United Provinces as the Dutch Republic, etc.) that it is a federation, which in fact it is not (or, not yet according to the optimistic European federalists). One main difference with other unions-federations, is that there exists no European Constitution, and thus, no European citizenship as such.

The institutional set up of the EU also reflects this ambiguity since it is a mixture of European level institutions like the European Commission (EC), the European Parliament (EP), the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Court(s) of Justice, and intergovernmental bodies like the Council of Ministers, the COREPER (a permanent body of ambassadors that set mainly the agenda for the Council’s meetings etc., somewhat similar to the Athenian Boule) and the Summits, consisting of heads of states and government. In fact, it is difficult to answer simple questions put by outsiders (or even Europeans) such as: “Which is the government of the EU? “, “Which is the law-making body?”

The answer to the first question is that the “EU government” is diffuse, at least between the Commission, the Councils of Ministers and the Summit. A related question, “who is the President of the EU?” does not have a clear-cut answer, because there are many: The President of the Commission, who changes every six months, the Chairman of the Summit, and the President of the European Council, Omit Donald Tusk. As to the law-making body, the answer “the European Parliament” would be partly wrong, since in law-making the Council of Ministers and the Parliament are both involved, in ways which are obscure for the majority of non-expert citizens. For example, how many citizens know and understand the procedure of budget setting? (with the various steps starting from the European Council (EC), to the European Parliament, the Council again, and then to the EP).

The institutional set up is also more convoluted than that of true federations which usually have a federal government (with a president or a prime minister as the real executive head), usually two law-giving bodies, a House of Representatives and Senate, a Federal Court and

Federal Bank. The EU has Summits, Councils of Ministers, Commission, EP, Eurogroup, ECB and European Court(s) of Justice. It has no European Finance Minister, but has a Minister of Foreign Affairs, who, to increase verbal confusion, is called the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. In practice he/she does not set foreign policy, which is mainly the responsibility of the heads of governments and states, and the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

But, apart from the complicated institutional set up, what differentiates the EU from real federations is the level of the EU budget compared to that of federations. It is about 1% of GDP, while that of the USA is about 20% and of Canada 15%. This means that not many policies can be implemented and financed at an EU level, as in true federations. Defense expenditure, which in true federations is about 2-3% of GDP and is a federal responsibility, is missing completely from the EU budget.

3. The democratization criteria

Athens

We use the following terms:

Isonomia, means equality before the law applied fully to all citizens without exception or any kind of qualification. Furthermore, the laws are promulgated by the citizens themselves through voting in the Assembly.

Isegoria, means the right to introduce proposals to be voted on by the Assembly by any citizen, and was the mainstay of democracy and applied fully.

Isokrateia, means that all political positions (including military and financial) are applied fully. All positions were open to any citizen, either by lot, or if they wished, for the few that required elections.

Logodosia, which we translate as procedural accountability, meant that all officials were fully accountable at the end of their term of office, usually of one year, and had to submit a full report of their activities. Furthermore, there were institutional procedures under which any citizen could accuse an office holder for not fulfilling his task properly, for abusing his position or for acting against the public good. The accused could defend himself either in front of the Assembly, or (depending on the type of accusation) in the courts. Even a citizen who was not an office holder, but who had introduced a proposal, could be accused if the proposal proved not to be beneficial to the state (against the public good) even if the Assembly had voted on it and adopted it. Acceptance by the Assembly did not absolve the proposer (called also “initiator”) of responsibility.

The most famous case illustrating this is the controversy between the orators Demosthenes and Aeschines, whose accusation of Demosthenes was based on the fact that his proposal to fight against the Macedonians and King Philip II, although it had been adopted by the Assembly, proved to be wrong and detrimental as it had led to defeat at the Battle of

Chaeronea in 338 BCE and the death of 1,000 Athenians. This led to the famous oration, On the Crown, by Demosthenes which is considered to be one of the masterpieces of oratory. Demosthenes won, but if he had lost, he would have faced heavy fines, possible banishment and even the death sentence.

A second possibility of procedural accounting used during the 5th century was ostracism, a kind of ex-ante safeguard against citizens who might become dangers to democracy. Under this, one citizen could be exiled as a cautionary measure, each year, for a period of ten years. Athenian direct democracy, especially through isegoria and logodosia, strove, in general successfully, to solve the principal-agent problem. Under isegoria and voting in the Assembly, the principal himself (the citizens) made the decisions and did not delegate them to representatives. Under logodosia, the agents were strictly controlled and faced strong penalties if the principal thought that they did not comply, or even if they were unsuccessful in fulfilling their instructions, . Thus, Athens, fulfilled fully all four democratization criteria.

Modern Greece

Equality before the law is guaranteed by the Greek constitution, but in fact, the Constitution itself violates it in one important aspect and this concerns the infamous article regarding the responsibility of the ministers and members of parliament who are given special treatment on various issues. In other words, a minister and a civil servant accused of the same crime, for example, fraud, face different procedures and different periods of statute of limitations. It is almost as if this article was inspired by G. Orwell’s Animal Farm; “we are all equal, but some (in our case, ministers and members of parliament) are more equal”.

But there are also numerous other cases in which equality before the law is abused, as for example, with a recent law (4387/2016) concerning pension funds, under which, depending on when an individual retires, people who have worked for exactly the same period of time (years) and for the same renumeration, receive different pensions. Another case concerns interest rates charged by the state for those who have obligations to the state (about 8.5% which seems close to usury under today’s rates of interest!) and a lower rate (about 6%) for obligations of the states towards citizens, such as payments to service providers etc. which are paid with a delay of as much as six months. So, the criterion of equality before the law is fulfilled only in part (some would say: in small part).

In modern democracies isegoria is practiced with popular proposals which lead, under specific conditions, to obligatory referendums with binding results, e.g. as in ancient democracies, to laws. Thus, popular initiatives (proposals) from bottom up is a form of citizens participation in decision making. States that have an institutional set up of this kind, (like Switzerland, Uruguay, New Zealand, the USA and Germany at the state and Länder level etc.) thus practice direct democracy, “government by the people”. Greece does not have such provisions, so this criterion is not fulfilled at all.

Isokrateia means that all political positions are open to all citizens. This criterion is fulfilled only in part since some, but not all, positions are open to all citizens. Any citizen has the right to be a candidate for Parliament, but the office of the President of the Republic is not open to all, because the President is not elected by the citizens, but by the members of Parliament. This means that the individual elected reflects the preference of the party or parties that have a majority in Parliament. And, of course, ancient Greek democrats would be astonished at the proliferation (not only in Greece) of bodies of “technical experts”, that regulate various activities, without being elected and without control, like the President of the Central Bank, the Radio and Television Board, the National Energy Board and many others. Thus, this criterion is also fulfilled only in part.

Procedural accounting, one of the pillars of ancient democracy, is either non-existent or tuned down in modern democracies. Politicians, administrators etc. do not publish accounts to justify to citizens their actions (and expenditures) during their period of office. The only type of “punishment” they face is that of not being re-elected if citizens feel that they have not fulfilled their pre-election promises. Some states (and states in federations like the USA) have a form of procedural accounting, the recall procedure, under which an official may be terminated before the end of his/her term of office, if he/she has lost the trust of his/her citizens-voters. The procedure is similar to that of popular proposals.

An issue related to accountability is who decides on the constitutionality of laws and who defines the “public good” or “public benefit”. In cases of direct democracy, the answer is straight forward: The citizens themselves, by voting at the Assembly, or through popular initiatives that lead to referenda with binding results. In representative democracies, referenda “top down”, after a decision by the government put decision making to the citizens. Some countries (Italy) use it often, other less so (France, Netherlands, Hungary, Greece, the UK, etc.) and others, at the federal level, not at all (USA, Germany).

Another way to define the constitutionality (or not) of a law, and thus in a wider sense, the public good, is through recourse to the courts, in countries that have Constitutional Courts, but in countries that do not, it is done through the lower levels of justice in a bottom-up

procedure, as in Greece. In order to make this clear, we illustrate briefly the procedure in Greece and France. In Greece, if an individual believes that a law is unconstitutional, in order to be able (justified) to bring it to court, he must prove that the law has caused him personal harm (financial or otherwise). This is a crucial difference from the definition of public good: In ancient democracies, any citizen could defend the “public good” as he understood it, by arguing that a law or decree was against it, without having to prove any personal damage. Any citizen could undertake the role of “defender of the public good” and thus, in a wide sense of democracy, against abuses. In modern Greece and in representative democracies, a citizen can defend only himself, not the general public good in the abstract, notwithstanding the last article of the Greek Constitution, which states that all Greeks must defend the Constitution and the country through their patriotism, etc. Without specific provisions as to how this may be done, this article is empty of substance. In fact, a citizen does not appeal to a court against a law he/she believes to be unconstitutional but against the consequences (to him/her) caused the law.

In a way, this is an indirect approval if the court deems that the person appealing is justified (in other words, that the law has proved harmful to him, in damaging property rights) then this is an indication that the law is unconstitutional. The procedure usually goes through the three levels of justice, reaching the two Supreme Courts, the Areios Pagos and the Supreme Administration Court known as, Simvoulio tis Epikratias. If there is disagreement in the voting of the two courts concerning the same law, then an ad hoc Supreme Court must decide. According to Law 345/76 this Special Court consists of the Presidents of the three courts (the third being the Court of Auditors), 4 members of Areios Pagos, 4 of the Supreme Court, and 2 university professors, elected by lot.

It goes without saying that this is a lengthy procedure that takes years. Once a law is found to have problems regarding its “constitutionality”, the government must change it, but again this does not happen automatically. It may take years, and in the meantime the administration must continue to enforce the (unconstitutional) law and citizens must continue to appeal. Of course, citizens have the right to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, whose rulings override (if contrary) any decisions of the Greek courts and thus become binding for the administration.

As a comparison, France has a Constitutional Court (Conseil Constitutionnel de la République Française) of nine members (as in the US Supreme Court) who are not necessarily career judges (as in the USA). They are appointed, three each by the President, the Parliament and the Senate for a nine-year term, thus surpassing the President’s term of office. The crucial difference

is that the Court can examine a law ex-ante, before its promulgation. Either the President of the Republic, the presidents of the Parliament or Senate, or 60 members of Parliament, or 60 senators can send a law before its promulgation to the Conseil for it to examine the law as to its constitutionality. If the Conseil decides that it is unconstitutional, the law is withdrawn (is not promulgated).An improvement in the Greek system would be the ex-ante examination of laws etc. by the Supreme Administration Court. This would avoid delays and amendments to or abolishment of laws that have been found be unconstitutional.

The argument against individuals having the right of appeal against laws, without having to prove a personal interest or damage, but just as defenders of the public good (as in ancient democracies) is that this could lead to so many appeals that the judicial system could be “flooded” and made unfunctional. The procedural answer is, to follow here also a similar approach to the popular initiatives: A popular initiative that attracts a minimum specified level of signatures on a particular issue, would be sufficient for the appeal in court to be legal. This means that if a sufficiently large number of citizens think that a law is unconstitutional, the court should examine the case, without these citizens having to prove personal damage or abuse arising out of the law.

Under direct democracy and citizen initiatives, the public good is decided by the citizens. Through initiatives, they can fill gaps (wherever the administration has not acted) or force the administration to change its behavior (or laws). Two cases illustrate this: California’s Proposition 13 that imposed a limit to Californian property taxes, and the Swiss referendum on buy-back of gold the Swiss Central Bank had sold from its gold reserves. With regard to the four criteria, Greece scores badly: Isegoria and logodosia do not apply at all, and isonomia and isokrateia only in part.

A few additional issues make the democratic deficit of Greece even clearer. Capital controls have been imposed for three years in Greece (since July 2015), thus abolishing one of the four main economic freedoms of the EU: free circulation of goods, services, labor and capital. Under the memoranda agreements, taxes have increased many times. Greeks today are the most heavily taxed among all OECD countries, receiving in return (in the form of service and goods) less than in all other OECD countries. According to the memoranda, Greece must

produce budget surpluses of 2,2% up to 2060, which restricts the freedom of economic policy and is recessionary. How democratic is it, to decide today for future generations, who are not yet born and do not vote?

Using different criteria and methodology, the Economist’s Intelligence Unit reaches similar results: Greece scores 8,54 (out of 10) and is not included among the Full Democracies. The situation is even worse according to the Economic Freedom Indicators for 2018, published by the Fraser Institute, where Greece occupies the 107th position, with an overall score of 6,46 (out of 10). In comparison, Greece’s neighbouring EU members, Bulgaria and Italy, score as follows: Bulgaria scores 7,41 and is ranked 46th while Italy scores 7,27 and is ranked 54th. Botswana, a democratic African country ranks 44 and scores 7,43. The three best performers are the following: at the top is Hong Kong with a score of 8,97, second is Singapore at 8,84 and third is New Zealand at 8,49.

European Union

Concerning isonomia, equality before the law, the situation is again somewhat confused. Europeans are equal according to the laws of the European Union, but these laws cover only some aspects and activities. Since there is no European Constitution, and thus no European citizenship, political and human rights are not specified at the EU level. Thus, abuses of human rights (mainly, property rights) may fall under the jurisdiction of the European Court(s) in Luxembourg (as for example, taxation issues) but more often under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg which is not an EU institution but one of the European Council.

Isokrateia, equality of political opportunity, applies only in part, since out of all political positions of the EU, only the EP is open (in theory at least) to all Europeans. All other posts are filled after intergovernmental negotiations and agreement. A European cannot be a candidate for President of the Commission, the Council, or for “foreign minister”, etc. Regarding isegoria, there is no provision for popular initiatives leading to obligatory referenda with binding results. So, this criterion does not apply at all.

There are no provisions for procedural accountability at the European level. European office holders do not give regular accounts at the end of their term, although the European Accounting Office (Cour de comptes) oversees the correct execution of the budget against fraud, waste etc. but not concerning political decisions (“European public good”). It is not possible for European citizens to call European officials to account, as in ancient democracies,

or modern democracies with recall procedures, such as Switzerland and in some American states. Out of the four criteria, two do not apply at all and the other two only in part. This is another validation of the well-known European democratic deficit.

4. Conclusions and proposals

The worrisome result concerning Greece and the EU is that Greece is one of the least democratic countries in the least democratic international association. Subsequent to the preceding discussion, we propose the following:

For Greece:

To establish full equality before the law, the abuses mentioned in the previous section should be abolished.

For isegoria, procedures of direct democracy, popular initiatives and the recall procedure should be introduced at the next revision of the constitution.

For equality of political opportunity, all political posts, such as the President of the Democracy, should be open to all citizens and be filled through elections, even members of regulatory bodies should be open and chosen through elections.

For procedural accountability, provisions could be made at the next revision of the constitution obliging all office holders to give public accounts of their term of tenure, combined with recall in cases of perceived misconduct.

For the European Union:

The strengthening of equality before the law depends on the solidification of the EU itself. The situation regarding this criterion would be very different if the EU became a true federation, with a federal Constitution, federal citizenship with human and civil property rights arising out of these. To ensure the criterion of isegoria, a change of the treaties in future should amend the Treaty of Lisbon’s provision for European initiatives, making their results legally binding. Lastly, to satisfy the criterion of isokrateia, the posts of the President of the Commission, the President of the Council, the President of the EU, the “foreign

minister” and the “finance minister” (if introduced) should be open and filled by elections. In this way the EU democratic deficit would be substantially reduced.

But why is the issue of democracy (or more democracy) important at all? The argument in favor of more democracy is an aggregate of various elements, economic, political, psychological and moral-philosophical. Numerous econometric studies for different countries, such as those of Matsusaka, Voigt and Blume and Blume and Voigt, show the economic superiority (measured in growth rates and welfare) of countries (states, cantons, lander) practicing direct democracy. Politically, the crucial argument in favor of direct democracy is that democracy is a “unity”, or, a “total” and not a “partial” value. In a democracy, citizens should have the final say in decision making. If one argues that citizens should be trusted to vote for parties and candidates, but not directly for issues which influence their lives, then they argue for a “partial”, or, “limited” democracy, and, therefore, in favor of not solving or reducing the principal-agent problem. From this point of view, “by the people” has no validity.

Psychologically, participation of citizens in decision making, actively increases their satisfaction and self-esteem, giving them a sense of influencing their lives, and not just being subject to decisions taken by others for them. Lastly, a moral philosophical justification of direct democracy, arising out of consideration of the value of free citizens. One aspect of democracy is dignity, to treat people as adults who have the freedom of choice and can and must be trusted, and not as “children” who cannot. Under direct democracy, individuals become more active participants in procedures and decisions which concern them, thus internalizing costs and benefits and becoming more conscious of their rights and obligations.

Perhaps it is also time for at least some EU members states to take more steps towards further EU integration, which will require: a common Constitution, and common currency, the euro, to be adopted by more and more member-states over time. Another supplementary but crucial issue is that of common citizenship. This is a complex issue, but if adopted in the future, it will actually lead to a federal pan-European structure, meaning for example, elections of the members of the EP through European, as opposed to national candidates, supplemented by a second chamber, the European Senate, where every member state will send two “national senators”, independent of population size, which will be more democratic, will exclude those unwilling to fulfill its democratic principles, and will be a pole of attraction for future members (as were most other ancient and current federations and the EU).

La saga des traités

Christian Franck

Professeur ordinaire émérite à l’Université catholique de Louvain, Professeur invité à l’Université Saint Louis/Bruxelles et à la Diplomatische Akademie Wien

Le 29 juin 1985, à Milan, le Conseil européen décide de convoquer une conférence intergouvernementale (CIG) chargée d’apporter au Traité CEE des modifications concernant tant les objectifs que les institutions de la Communauté: lancée début septembre, la CIG accouche, début décembre à Luxembourg, de l’Acte unique européen (AUE). La révision de 1985 n’est toutefois que la première étape d’un processus de négociation des traités européens qui va durer quelque vingt-cinq ans et trouver sa conclusion avec l’entrée en vigueur du Traité de Lisbonne au 1er décembre 2009. A l’Acte unique vont faire suite les Traités de Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice et Lisbonne, avec, entre ces deux derniers, l’intermède du Traité constitutionnel: cette enfilade de six Traités, en moyenne, un tous les quatre ans, a consolidé et approfondi les fondements de la construction européenne.

Comment expliquer cette succession de conférences intergouvernementales qui s’étend sur près de vingt-cinq ans? Quelle est la dynamique qui, un quart de siècle durant, remet chaque fois sur le métier le résultat du traité précédent, prenant l’allure de ces légendes scandinaves appelées saga, qui déroulent une série d’épisodes dont chacun des dénouements est provisoire?

L’entrée en vigueur au 1er décembre 2009 du Traité de Lisbonne marque le point d’orgue de ce processus. Vingt-cinq ans de CIG successives ont provoqué un fort sentiment de fatigue institutionnelle. En matière de révision des traités, l’on ne fera pas mieux ni plus avant longtemps. Reste que l’Union qui sort de cette saga s’est considérablement fortifiée. A travers l’accroissement de ses compétences, le renforcement de ses institutions et son expansion quasi-continentale, elle dispose d’un éventail de capacités et d’une envergure géographique sans commune mesure avec l’acquis d’avant 1985. A cet égard, et même si toute périodisation est quelque peu artificielle, les années 1985-

2010 représentent bien un moment particulier, une phase spécifique, bref un deuxième âge de la construction européenne par rapport auquel il y a un avant et un après.

L’avant et l’après

L’avant? C’est le premier âge, celui des années cinquante, avec la déclaration Schuman et les Traités CECA, CEEA et CEE c’est aussi celui des crises des années soixante, notamment entre la France gaulliste et ses partenaires, qui sont surmontées au sommet de La Haye en décembre 1969 par le triptyque “achèvement, approfondissement et élargissement“. L’amorce d’une relance est confirmée au sommet de Paris d’octobre 1972, qui fixe pour 1980 le passage à l’union européenne et la réalisation de l’union économique et monétaire.

Cet échéancier sera rapidement différé: la décennie 1970 est celle du désordre monétaire international, des chocs pétroliers, de la stagnation et de l’inflation, du déclin des secteurs industriels traditionnels, sidérurgie en tête. En 1979 commence aussi l’exténuante négociation de plus quatre ans sur le “money back“, la ristourne budgétaire réclamée par Margaret Thatcher. Confrontée à une accumulation des défis, la construction communautaire marque le pas. Elle évite le naufrage mais reporte les grandes avancées prévues pour 1980 à des jours meilleurs. Apparaît aussi une première vague d’europessimisme, surnommée “eurosclérose“,qui instille le doute sur la poursuite de l’entreprise.

Il y eut donc un “avant“ les années 1985-2010. Il y a déjà un “après“. A peine l’encre du Traité de Lisbonne est-elle sèche qu’une série d’épreuves ébranle le nouvel édifice européen. Survient la crise de la dette souveraine, qui culmine à l’été 2015 avec l’évitement de justesse, d’un Grexit; le Brexit suit de peu, qui va encombrer pour plus de quatre ans l’agenda de l’Union. A partir de 2014, la vague des migrations révèle l’inconsistance d’une politique commune d’immigration et d’asile et menace l’acquis de l’espace Schengen. Au plan de l’action extérieure, la détérioration des relations avec la Russie, après l’annexion de la Crimée, et le distanciement des liens transatlantiques depuis l’entrée à la Maison banche de Donald Trump, révisent à la baisse l’ambition européenne de jouer un rôle de premier plan sur la scène internationale.

Dans les eaux mouvantes de la décennie en cours, l’Union navigue à vue. C‘est à traité constant et avec les capacités existantes qu’elle “improvise“ les réponses aux nouveaux défis. Les débats de la décennie finissante manifestent les carences et limites d’une construction qui reste inachevée. Certes, une volonté de refondation et de renaissance, dont le président français E. Macron est le héraut, se fait à nouveau jour. En même temps,

une poussée “souveraino-populiste” milite pour le retour à une Europe des nations. Sans doute une nouvelle ère de réforme et de restructuration de l’ensemble européen finira-t-elle par advenir. Mais entre l’avant-AUE et l’après-Lisbonne, quelle a été, revenons-y, la dynamique historique de la saga des six traités? Quelle a été la trame de ce deuxième âge de la construction européenne? Plutôt qu’une analyse de contenu approfondie de chacun des traités, l’on mettra surtout en lumière la dynamique de leurs enchaînements, les ressorts de leur enfilade.

L’Acte unique européen (AUE)

Début des années 1980, il apparaît que l’objectif majeur du Traité CEE, l’instauration d’un marché commun, est loin d’être réalisé. L’union douanière a été mise en place dès juillet 1968 et la politique agricole commune a pris consistance dans la décennie 1960. Mais l’espace économique communautaire reste segmenté: de multiples obstacles non-tarifaires le cloisonnent; le rapprochement des législations n’avance guère et la libre circulation des personnes, des services et des capitaux piétine. L’on évoque les “coûts de la Non-Europe“. Le besoin d’un nouvel élan se fait pressant. Il s’amorce au milieu des années 1980.

En juin 1984, le Conseil européen de Fontainebleau désigne Jacques Delors président de future la Commission qui entrera en fonction en janvier 1985. Celui-ci choisit de faire de l’avènement d’un grand marché intérieur le levier d’une relance de la construction européenne.

D’emblée, la nouvelle Commission s’attelle à la rédaction d’un “Libre blanc“ sur le marché intérieur, catalogue de près de trois cents mesures législatives destinées à mettre en place pour fin 1992 un “espace économique sans frontières“ (physiques, normatives et fiscales) – on l’ appellera aussi marché unique –qui réalise la libre circulation des marchandises, des personnes, des services et des capitaux. Remis le 14 juin 1985, le “Livre blanc“ se trouver sur la table du Conseil européen réuni à Milan les 28 et 29 juin 1985. Il y voisine un autre document, le rapport du “comité ad hoc pour les questions institutionnelles“, appelé aussi comité Dooge.

Ce comité avait été chargé par le Conseil européen de juin 1984, le même qui avait désigné Delors à la présidence de la Commission, de faire des suggestions pour l’amélioration du fonctionnement de la “coopération européenne dans le domaine communautaire comme dans celui de la coopération politique.“ Remis fin mars 1985, son rapport préconise, lui aussi, la formation d’un “espace économique intérieur homogène“et se prononce pour l’inclusion des questions de sécurité dans le champ de la politique étrangère; il propose des modifications institutionnelles, dont l’extension du vote à majorité qualifiée au Conseil et la participation du Parlement européen au processus législatif. Il préconise enfin la convocation d’une conférence intergouvernementale qui ferait entrer ces réformes dans les traités: “la seule décision des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement de convoquer cette conférence, conclut-il, aurait une valeur hautement symbolique et marquerait l’acte de fondation de l’Union européenne.“ Cette convocation devient l’enjeu crucial du Conseil européen qui se réunit à Milan les 28 et 29 juin 1985.

Margaret Thatcher est traditionnellement hostile au vote à la majorité qualifiée (VMQ) au Conseil. Elle estime donc qu’il n’y a pas lieu de l’étendre et s’oppose à une révision formelle des traités qui irait dans ce sens. En revanche, la présidence italienne -avec B. Craxi comme chef de gouvernement et G. Andreotti ministre des affaires étrangères- tient à la convocation de la CIG; F. Mitterrand et H. Kohl comme les dirigeants du Benelux y sont aussi favorables. Arguant de ce qu’il s’agit d’une simple question de procédure, B. Craxi procède au vote: six pour, trois contre (Royaume-Uni, Danemark, Grèce). M. Thatcher s’insurge: comment peut-on convoquer à la majorité simple une CIG dont le résultat requiert la ratification par tous les Etats membres? A quoi les tenants de la CIG répliquent que la procédure de révision du Traité (art. 236 CEE) ne prévoyant pas de disposition particulière pour la convocation de la CIG, celle-ci relève de l’art. 148:“le Conseil délibère à majorité simple sauf lorsque le Conseil en dispose autrement“.... Telle est l’argumentation juridique qui sous-tend le vote du 29 juin.

La CIG s’ouvre à Luxembourg le 9 septembre et s’y conclut les 2 et 3 décembre. Pour l’essentiel, le cours de la négociation consiste à réaliser trois types de linkage qui font la substance de l’Acte unique. La première liaison proportionne l’extension du vote à majorité qualifiée (VMQ) à la mise en œuvre du Livre blanc sur le marché intérieur. La mesure s‘applique principalement au rapprochement des législations (art. 100 CEE) qui était freiné par l’exigence de l’unanimité. Le confinement de la réforme institutionnelle à l’établissement du marché intérieur lève les préventions de Mme Thatcher. Une deuxième liaison consiste à introduire le thème de la “cohésion économique et sociale“qui doit réduire les écarts de

développement entre les régions. Il s’agit d’une dimension de solidarité qui fait contrepoids à l’objectif néo-libéral de l’espace sans frontières. Elle sera la matrice du développement des fonds structurels, qui absorbera progressivement plus d’un tiers du budget de l’Union.

Conjuguant réforme institutionnelle et marché intérieur, marché intérieur et cohésion économique et sociale,l’AUE inclut aussi la codification de la “coopération européenne en matière de politique étrangère. Celle-ci avait été entreprise de façon pragmatique et selon des procédures “ad hoc“ dès le début des années 1970. La CIG avait pour mandat de configurer les contours d’une “politique étrangère et de sécurité“; elle se limite à donner forme juridique à la pratique existante, sans inclure la dimension militaire de la sécurité, autrement dit la défense. La codification de cette coopération, qui reste de nature intergouvernementale, ferait-elle l’objet d’un traité distinct, ou serait couplée aux amendements des traités communautaires? Pour signifier que les deux aspects doivent “contribuer ensemble à faire progresser concrètement l’Union européenne“, on les réunit dans un seul et même texte: d’où l’appellation d’Acte unique européen (AUE). Celui-ci sera signé en deux temps, les 17 et 28 février 1986, le Danemark, l’Italie et la Grèce ayant quelque peu différé leur signature. L’entrée en vigueur survient le 1er juillet 1987.

Le moment de Maastricht

Même si elles furent d’abord sous-évaluées, les avancées de l’AUE étaient notables: marché intérieur et fonds structurels au nom de la cohésion économique et sociale restent aujourd’hui des fondamentaux de l’Union. Les limites étaient aussi manifestes: à travers une procédure de “coopération“, le Parlement n’avait obtenu qu’un ersatz de participation à la décision législative; les progrès en matière de politique étrangère et de sécurité restaient cosmétiques. Enfin, même si la définition en restait vague, l’on restait sous le seuil de ce qui devait devenir l’Union européenne. Quant au thème de l’union économique et monétaire, il demeurait hors sujet, quoique J. Delors, au grand dam de Mme Thatcher, ait pu glisser à l’art. 20 AUE que des modifications concernant la politique économique et monétaire passeraient par une CIG.

Précisément, une double dynamique, fonctionnelle et géopolitique, va bientôt jouer en faveur de la monnaie unique. Du point de vue fonctionnel, il apparaît que le futur espace économique sans frontières devrait être placé sous une coupole de stabilité monétaire: le marché unique appelle la monnaie unique. A plus court terme, celle-ci serait aussi requise pour contrer les manœuvres spéculatives qui ébranlent le Système monétaire européen(SME) créé en 1979: une monnaie unique désarmerait la spéculation qui joue les

monnaies européennes les unes contre les autres. L’idée est notamment défendue par D. Genscher, le ministre allemand des étrangères; elle suscite de fortes réticences de la part de la Bundesbank.

Quoiqu’il en soit, en juin 1988, le Conseil européen de Hanovre, sous présidence allemande donc, charge un comité composé des gouverneurs des Banques centrales mais présidé par le président de la Commission, J. Delors, de faire des propositions concernant un processus menant à l’union économique et monétaire (UEM). Ce “comité Delors“ remet son rapport en avril 1989. Il préconise la création d’une banque centrale agissant en toute indépendance, soustraite à l’emprise des gouvernements. L’objectif de la politique monétaire serait la stabilité des prix. La marche à l’UEM se ferait en trois étapes qui s’enchaînent de façon irréversible: la libre circulation serait suivie de la convergence des économies, avant que la fixation irrévocable de parité ne fasse naître la monnaie unique. Conformément à l’art. 20 AUE, c’est une conférence intergouvernementale qui établirait les dispositions relatives aux phases 2 et 3. La convocation d’une CIG sur l’UEM devient un enjeu politique majeur de l’agenda européen.

La mutation politique qui s’amorce en Europe de l’Est -ébranlement des régimes socialistes et de l’Union soviétique elle-même- lie aussi la marche à l’UEM à un dessein géopolitique: il s’agit d’assurer l’ancrage dans la construction européenne d’une Allemagne destinée à se réunifier. La préoccupation est vive, surtout à Paris, de la voir se détourner de l’Europe occidentale et reprendre un rôle central dans la Mitteleuropa. Aussi l’abandon du Deutschemark au profit d’une monnaie unique devient-il le gage de l’engagement allemand dans la poursuite de l’intégration européenne. Telle est la réflexion stratégique qui prédomine à l’Elysée et qui pousse le président Mitterrand à demander la convocation d’une CIG sur l’union économique et monétaire. Celle-ci devient la priorité pour le second semestre 1989, où le Conseil est sous présidence française.

Si Paris veut que le semestre s’achève sur la convocation d’une CIG sur l’union économique et monétaire, le chancelier allemand est moins pressé. Il admet le principe du passage à la monnaie unique mais estime que l’union politique (UP) doit venir d’abord. Mesurant les résistances de l’opinion ouest-allemande face à l’abandon du DM, il veut éviter que ce thème n’interfère avec les élections législatives du 2 décembre 1990. Pour H. Kohl, le “UP zuerst“(d’abord) relève de la pédagogie politique: il doit convaincre ses concitoyens que l’UEM est la conséquence d’un degré élevé d’unité européenne.

La chute du Mur de Berlin dans la nuit du 9 au 10 novembre renforce les considérations géopolitiques françaises. La convocation de la CIG est bien à l’agenda du Conseil européen de Strasbourg des 8 et 9 décembre.“Cela fait vingt ans, depuis le rapport Werner, qu’on prépare la monnaie unique, l’heure est venue de décider“, insiste F. Mitterrand: la CIG s’ouvrira avant la fin de l’année 1990, après les élections allemandes du 2 décembre. H. Kohl a renoncé au prérequis de l’union politique.