OIL POLLUTION FROM OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH

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Κωδικός Προϊόντος: 21185
Kepesidi A.
Dr. Athanassiou L.
ΜΕΛΕΤΕΣ ΝΑΥΤΙΚΟΥ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΥ - MARITIME LAW STUDIES
Athanassiou L.
  • Έκδοση: 2025
  • Σχήμα: 17x24
  • Βιβλιοδεσία: Εύκαμπτη
  • Σελίδες: 536
  • ISBN: 978-618-08-0636-6

Offshore oil production is an innovative activity in the Greek territory. The regulatory framework for oil extraction is complex and the contractual relationships linking market players are numerous and inspired by proven contractual frameworks of other legal orders. Through a comparative approach, this book succeeds in answering many of the questions faced by professionals involved in offshore oil drilling.

- To what extent does the new Private Maritime Law Code apply to offshore oil platforms?

- Can international maritime conventions be used to establish civil liability for accidents involving offshore installations?

- What is the standard practice for insuring ships and offshore installations operating in the field of oil extraction?

- What is the most effective way to bring claims for environmental damage?

- How can the civil liability claims of a victim of an environmental disaster be accelerated?

- What room for improvement is there for safety rules for oil and gas drilling?

This book is aimed at legal and professional specialists in the maritime, insurance, environmental and energy sectors, public officials, academics and port officers operating in the wider Mediterranean region.

PREFACE 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

ABBREVIATION LIST 

1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 A short history of oil 1

1.2 Offshore exploration and production 4

A. The challenges of exploration and production at sea 5

B. The main market actors 8

C. Law of the Sea ramifications for offshore production 11

1.3 Oil pollution in the offshore sector 15

A. A wake-up call: Montara and Deepwater Horizon 16

B. Greek dreams of an oil-producing state 21

C. The need for oil-specific regulation 26

2

SERVING THE IDEAL OF PREVENTION

2.1 International regulation of health and safety at sea 29

A. The public international law dimension 31

B. The autonomy of maritime law 37

C. Maritime law crossing invisible lines 40

D. The international regulatory gap for H&S in offshore operations 45

2.2 Think globally, act locally 50

A. Regional solutions for global problems 50

B. The Offshore Protocol of the Barcelona Convention 58

C. The Offshore Safety Directive 60

D. Bilateral Agreements in the Mediterranean Sea 63

2.3 National Approaches 69

A. Application of pre-existing general regulation 70

B. Prescriptive or command-and-control regulation 72

C. Objective or goal-setting regulation 75

2.4 The anatomy of objective regulation systems 80

A. A plan against accidents 80

B. From the operator.... 83

C. ... to an independent competent authority 85

D. Involvement of the workers 88

E. Independent Verification 90

F. Safety threshold 92

2.5 Industry Engagement 94

A. Purely voluntary initiatives 95

B. Voluntary Self-regulation 100

C. Mandated Self-Regulation 102

D. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? 105

2.6 Regulatory tools to ensure compliance 106

A. Official Notice 107

B. Administrative and civil fines 109

C. Criminal sanctions 112

D. Suspension-Revocation of license 116

E. Conclusion: The need for an enforcement strategy 118

2.7 Conclusions: a shift in decision-making power 121

A. Draw from lessons of the past 124

B. Gather and use reliable data 124

C. Combine the prescriptive and objective approaches 125

D. Learn, but do not remain a student 125

E. H&S in the Greek offshore sector 126

3

DESIGNING A LIABILITY REGIME

3.1 An autonomous liability system 131

A. The first step forward: a vigorous international maritime regime 137

I) The International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC) 138

II) The International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution
Damage (BOPC) 142

III) The International Convention on Liability and Compensation
for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS Convention) 143

B. Efforts for an offshore international regime 145

I) Convention on Civil Liability from Exploration and Exploitation of Seabed
Mineral Resources (CLEE) 146

II) The CMI Initiatives: the Rio Draft (1977) 147

III) The CMI Initiatives: the Sydney Draft (1993) 148

IV) The CMI Initiatives: the Vancouver/CMLA Draft (2001) 148

C. Landing on the middle ground: the soft law approach 149

I) Indonesian and IMO Guidelines (2011-2014) 149

II) A lost chance for regional instruments? 152

D. Unilateral regulation 154

I) United States: Mirroring CLC with OPA 155

II) Norway: A traditional civil law approach 156

III) United Kingdom: Embracing private initiative 157

IV) The Overarching European Legal Order 158

E. Conclusions: missed opportunities 161

3.2 The material scope of an autonomous regime 162

A. The Maritime industry 163

I) Persistent oil as cargo 164

II) Bunker oil as fuel 170

III) Other oily substances and hydrocarbons 171

B. The offshore industry 174

I) As long as it moves...: the Rio & Sydney Draft 174

II) Drawing the lines between the two industries: the CMLA Draft 175

III) An approach focused on production wells: the CLEE. 175

IV) Soft Law Approach: The Indonesian, IMO, and Barcelona Convention Guidelines 177

V) A trans-industry approach: OPA 177

VI) An approach focused on production: OPOL 178

VII) A holistic approach: the Petroleum Activities Act 179

C. European regulatory tools 180

I) The Environmental Liability Directive 180

II) Waste legislation 182

D. Conclusions: expansive trends 187

3.3 The geographical scope of the regime 189

A. Lex loci damni prevailing in the maritime industry 189

B. Lex loci delicti for the oil and gas industry 190

C. National provisions: favouring transnational litigation 192

D. European regulatory tools: extension through law and jurisprudence 194

E. Conclusions: Lex loci damni as a more social choice 195

3.4 The type of claims compensated 198

A. Claims excluded by civil liability pollution regimes 200

B. Maritime Industry 202

I) CLC as the rule of thumb for admissible claims 202

a) Clean-up operations 203

b) Environmental damage 204

c) Preventive measures 205

d) Property damage 206

e) Consequential loss 206

f) Pure economic loss 206

II) Adjustments for other liability regimes 207

C. Oil and Gas Industry 209

I) CLEE Convention 209

II) OPOL Agreement 210

III) Petroleum Activities Act 211

IV) OPA 212

a) Pure economic losses 213

b) Natural resource damage 217

D. European regulatory tools 218

E. Conclusions: How clean is clean? 221

3.5 The standard of fault required 225

A. The shortcomings of fault-based liability 226

B. Strict liability: the exception that became the rule 227

C. Instances of exoneration of the liable party 230

I) Act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection 230

II) Natural phenomenon of exceptional, irresistible character. 231

III) Act or omission done with intent to cause damage by a third party 232

IV) Negligent/wrongful act of the government 233

V) Act or omission from the victim of pollution 234

VI) No knowledge of the risk of the pollutant 234

VII) Act of terrorism 235

VIII) Instances of exoneration for the second level of liability 235

D. Conclusions: a rule with exceptions 236

3.6 The liable party 237

A. Considerations on designating a liable party 237

I) Channelled 238

II) Exclusive 239

III) Joint and several liability 240

B. The shipowner and a Fund 241

I) CLC-IOPC System 241

II) HNS 246

C. The operator 248

I) CLEE 248

II) OPOL 249

D. The licensee and another party 251

I) PAA 251

II) ELD 252

III) The Barcelona guidelines 253

IV) The CMLA draft, the Indonesian Guidelines 254

E. Joint and several liability 254

I) OPA 254

II) BOPC 258

III) Waste 260

F. The contractual practice of allocating risks: 261

I) Among the licensees: a joint operating agreement (JOA) 261

a) The Operator 263

b) The Operating Committee 265

c) Exceptions in the principle of joint responsibility: Sole risk
and non-consent projects 266

II) Between the operator and the contractors: knock-for-knock clauses 267

a) The origins of knock-for-knock clauses 267

b) The main elements of knock-for-knock clauses 269

c) Questions of allocation of liability 270

G. Conclusions: a decision based on principle 272

I) The owner 272

II) The contractor 273

III) The operator and the licensee 274

IV) A second tier of compensation 275

3.7 A transfer of teachings: oil pollution liability in Greece 277

A. The material scope of the existing provisions 279

I) Maritime Law Provisions 279

II) General Environmental Protection Provisions 281

B. The geographical scope of application 284

C. Strict or fault-based liability 285

D. The type of claims compensated 286

E. Dispersed liability 291

I) Maritime Law Provisions 291

II) General Environmental Protection Provisions 292

F. A Joint Venture in Greece 294

G. Conclusions 295

4

ENSURING EFFECTIVE COMPENSATION

4.1 Providing compensation in pollution incidents 299

4.2 Limitation of liability 301

A. Traditional justification of limitation 301

I) Viewing maritime as a separate activity from other sectors 301

II) Increased danger of the activity 302

III) The vessel as an easy target for the creditors 303

B. Modern views on limitation 303

I) Protectionism towards the sector 303

II) Protection of the parties benefitting from the industry 304

III) Facilitation of handling of claims 305

IV) Insurability 305

C. Limited liability 306

I) The tonnage of the vessel as a criterion for limitation 306

a) CLC -IOPC 307

b) BOPC-LLMC 311

Rationae personae 312

Rationae materiae 315

Rationae loci 318

c) HNS 319

d) OPA- vessels provisions 322

II) A fixed sum of limitation 324

a) CLEE 325

b) OPOL 327

c) OPA-offshore installations provisions 327

D. Losing the benefit of limitation 329

E. Unlimited liability: a systematic or a qualitative approach? 332

F. Conclusions: historic inclinations instead of informed choices 333

I) Deciding on limited or unlimited liability 334

II) The amount of limitation 335

4.3 Financial security for oil pollution 339

A. The argument of insurability 339

I) Financial security as an element of effective compensation 339

II) Obligatory financial security as a tool of deterrence 341

III) Financial security as a finite capacity 342

B. The maritime industry: financial security for oil spills 343

I) Equal to the limits of liability 343

II) The international maritime practice: the Blue card 343

III) The American approach: the Certificate of Financial Responsibility 347

IV) The domination of P&I Clubs 349

V) The provided cover 351

VI) The American struggle 353

VII) The offshore practice 354

C. Oil and Gas industry: Flexible solutions for an unharmonized regime 356

I) Oil pollution-specific financial security 356

a) The Indonesian proposal and the Canadian Draft 356

b) CLEE 357

c) OPOL and other arrangements 358

d) Certificate of Financial Responsibility for offshore units 361

II) Not oil-pollution-specific financial security 363

a) The Barcelona and IMO Guidelines 363

b) PAA 363

c) European tools 364

III) Market practice for underwriting risks 366

IV) Flexibility in financial instruments 371

a) Insurance 371

b) Self-Insurance 374

c) Pooling Mechanisms 375

d) Alternative Forms of Financial Security 379

D. Conclusions: Different markets require different solutions 380

I) In relation to mandatory insurance for oil pollution 380

II) In relation to allowing for flexible types of insurance 381

III) In relation to determining the insuring capacity of the sector 382

IV) Direct action against the insurer and enforcement mechanisms 383

4.4 Creation of funds 384

A. Socialisation as a financing reserve 385

B. Financing and allocation of Funds 386

I) Private or public 386

II) Methodology 387

a) IOPC Fund 387

b) OSLTF FUND 388

c) OPOL 389

C. Interaction with other levels of compensation 390

D. Submission of claims 391

I) IOPC Fund 391

II) OSLTF 392

III) OPOL 393

E. Interim payments 393

I) IOPC FUND 394

II) OPA 395

F. Conclusions: Regionality as an answer 395

I) Feasibility of an International Fund 396

II) Feasibility of a National Fund 397

III) Feasibility of a Regional Fund 398

4.5 Mass claims and de facto funds 399

A. Class Actions in the American Jurisdiction 401

B. The Gulf Coast Compensation Facility 404

I) The operation of the GCCF 404

II) Lack of clarity in the distribution of the Fund 405

III) Lack of impartiality of the administrator of the Fund 406

IV) Insufficient routes to contest decisions 407

V) A judicial intervention 408

C. The Multidistrict Litigation and class certification 409

D. The Norwegian example 412

E. Conclusions: state supervision as a guarantee 412

4.6 Effective compensation in Greece? 415

A. Unlimited liability for offshore production 415

B. Financial security during oil production 419

C. Modelling a National Fund 422

I) The Green Fund 422

II) The limitation Funds created under Maritime Law 423

III) Insolvency law provisions 428

D. Collective redress in the Greek legal system 431

I) Common principles and challenges on collective redress 431

II) Provisions on the protection of consumers 435

III) The ‘Pilot’ Trial of Article 20A of the Code of Civil procedure 438

IV) Competition Law provisions 440

E. Conclusions: A long way to go 443

5

FINAL CONCLUSIONS

Α. Preventive action 447

Β. Designing a liability regime 449

C. Ensuring effective compensation 451

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources 457

Case Law 475

Secondary Sources 477

Other sources 500

Interviews 508

INDEX 509

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1

INTRODUCTION

There is no rule on how to write. Sometimes it comes easily and perfectly; sometimes it’s like drilling rock and then blasting it out with charges.

Ernest Hemingway

1.1 A short history of oil

1 Black, liquid gold. A name very fitting for petroleum, a resource that has been the most valuable commodity of the past century and whose price still influences heavily the energy markets and the global economy. That was not always the case.

2 The word petrol etymologically derives from the Greek word «πέτρα» and the Latin word «olium» which translates as “the oil of the stone” There are many references to petroleum and its uses that date back thousands of years. Archaeological evidence trace the use of oil 6000 years ago in the banks of the Euphrates as an insulator for ships, while Herodotus mentions that asphalt was used as a mortar between building stones and for the construction of the tower of Babylon. Apart from the insulating and stabilizing properties of some forms of petrol, the Ancient Greeks, the Persians and the Japanese were also aware of its properties as fire ignitors. From the seventh century onwards, the Byzantines had devised a mixture called «υγρό πυρ» (literally translated as liquid fire or oleum incendiarium) that had the unique property of catching fire upon physical contact with moisture. The chemical formula of this substance, which was considered one of the most devastating and feared weapons of the time, was a well-guarded secret, but it is widely established that it contained petroleum.

3 Unfortunately, the knowledge of the properties of oil followed the ill fate of much of the achievements of the ancient world: it was forgotten. The Western civilization managed to erase from its collective memory the chemical properties of petroleum, which downgraded to a mere peculiarity of nature, that was occasionally used as a medicinal remedy for a variety of conditions. This changed during the 19th century,

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when it was affirmed that ‘rock oil’ could be distilled into several fractions, all composed of carbon and hydrogen. One of those fractions, kerosene, was a highly illuminating oil that could be cheaply distilled from petroleum. Kerosene lamps captured the illuminating market and that lead to an increase in petroleum consumption. At the same time, the industrial revolution led to significant technological, social and economic changes and petroleum was re-introduced initially as a lubricant for the large machines that were running on coal and later as a fuel for a new invention: the automobile. The production of oil was intensified, and, instead of collecting it with primitive means, many daring and resourceful entrepreneurs came up with solutions for its extraction and transportation to satisfy demand.

4 Petroleum unfolded its various uses as an illuminant, an explosive, an insulator and a power generator and contributed to the rise of some of the biggest and more influential companies in the world. But oil upgraded its status as a strategic resource after the British Navy Admiral, Winston Churchill, decided right before the First World War to gain a competitive advantage in terms of speed and power and commissioned a fleet of armed vessels that were running not on coal (as it was accustomed at the time) but on petroleum. Since the United Kingdom had no oil that made it imperative that the British controlled Saudi Arabian oil. The control, extraction and transportation of oil became the most important sovereign bet and fueled several armed conflicts. The thirst for oil also resulted in amazing technical advancements: a booming oil industry wanted this resource extracted in every possible and cost-efficient way. The reason for this intense need for oil derives from the concept of ‘energy security’.

5 Energy security has been defined as “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price”. This is a very broad definition, an ‘umbrella’ term that

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translates to a wide range of strategies for different states. For some countries (like the USA, where the limited energy resources made the country susceptible to political extorsion), the focus was always to acquire energy independence through securing oil reserves, preferably from domestic production. In Europe, where the finite energy sources are reducing rapidly, governments aim to diversify the sources of energy by (among other things) diversifying the suppliers of hydrocarbons.

6 On the eve of the 21st century though, those strategies are widely reconsidered. Oil is a heavy pollutant and burning its derivatives contributes immensely to CO2 emissions. After scientific evidence on climate change was produced back in the 70s, public opinion and the political will have gradually shifted towards greener and more sustainable energy sources. Renewable energy has been put at the top of the political priorities in the energy field, energy security is achieved through the introduction of renewables in the energy mix and the less polluting of hydrocarbons, gas has been taking over markets that traditionally belonged to petroleum acting as a ‘transit fuel’ for a greener era.

7 So, is the oil industry redundant, a mere sector of the past and part of the human history of evolution? Experts seem to disagree, and despite decelerating oil demand growth(partly thanks to other renewables), gas and nuclear energy, oil is set to retain the highest share in the global energy mix covering 31% of global energy requirements until 2040. Disregarding the growing needs of developing countries in energy and the expected population rise, there are other reasons why oil is still relevant:

8 First and foremost, it is true, green energy is the way to go forward. The technological advancements (and considerable public financial resources spend in that direction) are making the production of energy from renewable sources more and more cost-efficient. Yet, not all markets are ready to transition to renewable energy. For some of the energy uses of petrol (such as its use as aeroplane fuel), substitution is currently not easy or (in some cases) feasible.

9 Secondly, hydrocarbons are extremely important for energy security because they can balance the continuously fluctuating demands of the energy grid by providing quickly and reliably the needed amounts of energy. Renewables on the other hand are by their nature much less dependable and cannot be used as a base fuel. It is also important

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to remember that hydrocarbons do not function merely as generators of energy but also as a type of ‘battery’ since they can be stored to produce energy at a later stage (when burned), which is also partly the reason behind strategic oil reserves in a national and regional scale. For that reason, a full turn to alternative sources of energy can only be paired with a significant evolution of the existing battery technology.

10 Thirdly, the use of petroleum as an energy source is not only connected to the available alternatives. Many countries (and especially the ones that have petroleum resources available in abundance) are reluctant to invest in the renewables sector. This can be attributed to several factors, from the national interest for energy security to a need to recuperate the capital invested in specialized infrastructure, before venturing to new sectors.

11 Finally, petroleum might be extremely important due to its function as an energy source, but its uses are not limited to meeting our energy needs. Plastics, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, fertilizers, synthetic rubber, detergents and so many other products include some form of petroleum in their ingredients. Therefore, substituting it completely might not be feasible for some years. Taking into account all the above, a discussion around petroleum exploration, extraction and the legislative framework regulating them is far from redundant, on the contrary, it is imperative.

1.2 Offshore exploration and production

12 Long before the increase of both traditional and unconventional supplies, the global economy became aware that the oil reserves found on land might not be sufficient to cover the growing energy needs. A declining output and an increased demand (especially during the oil crisis) have been ‘pushing’ the industry into the more difficult (both technically and politically) offshore areas. Offshore oil exploration and production is already systematically occurring in the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean, the South China Sea, the wider region of West Africa, the Persian Gulf,

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the Caspian Sea and of course the North Sea and the Mediterranean. In Europe, approximately 1100 offshore installations are installed in the EEZ of the Member States of the European Union and Norway. Undeniably, those operations are more challenging than onshore drilling, since the operators work in the open sea, in extreme heat or cold and with no direct connection to land.

A. The challenges of exploration and production at sea

13 To fully appreciate the complexity and the challenges of such operations, a short overview of offshore exploration and production is deemed necessary. The initial step of such a process is estimating the existence of an oil reserve. This stage is by far the most accessible to small and medium-sized companies because it is done through desk research with data available to the general public. Geologists rely on geophysicists to collect and process indirect images of subsurface earth properties. Such images are provided by satellites that can measure subtle changes or anomalies in the Earth’s gravity and magnetic fields, caused by sub-surface variations in rock type and structure. This is useful in locating the oil reserves because of the way oil and gas reserves are formed, which creates a very particular, relatively easily identifiable geophysical pattern.

14 If such a promising subsurface is identified, the next step is contacting a seismic survey. This is essentially a more detailed mapping of a region through the use of

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seismic waves. In practical terms, seismic waves are produced by a survey ship equipped with energy sources, known as guns, that repeatedly fire pressure waves into the water column. For a company to contact a seismic survey in the jurisdiction of a state, it is needed to secure specific permission called an exploration license. Exploration licenses are not exclusive in nature and usually cover a sizeable territory which is called a field.

15 After the relevant data have been assembled and the existence of a reserve is conjectured, an oil company might wish to acquire a license to drill. This is called a production license and, contrary to an exploration license, is exclusive and connected to a strict development plan that determines the pace of the operations. The initial drills that take place are called exploratory drillings and are carried out to determine the results of the original survey, the structure and size of the field as well as the existence of hydrocarbons. If it is deemed that oil production is commercially viable and that extraction of hydrocarbons is possible, then the borehole is temporarily sealed until the appropriate equipment for the exploitation of the reserve is in place.

16 This leads to the third (and most profitable) stage of offshore operation, called the production phase. Production is also taking place under a production license and according to the development plan. To drill an oil company uses a variety of offshore units. Fixed and floating units vary in forms, sizes and in the mechanics used to stabilize themselves at the bottom of the sea. Furthermore, in principle, they do not operate autonomously but are connected to needed infrastructure and auxiliary facilities. Fixed platforms were the first types of platforms to appear in the offshore oil industry but in the last decades, the market is favoring floating offshore units for many reasons:

17 A floating offshore unit can be moved to multiple locations to assess the size (or even existence) of a reserve and to reach depths where the construction of a fixed platform might be challenging, or even impossible. From a commercial point of view, companies that operate in more than one site can move the unit around

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and save the expense of building the needed infrastructure from scratch. Finally, decommissioning costs are significantly reduced since there is no need to remove a fixed structure, only to seal and secure the wellhead.

18 The final phase of drilling is decommissioning. Decommissioning is required by international law, even though each country has a certain discretion on the rate and the extent of the removal it strives to achieve. When the field ceases to be a commercially viable asset, the offshore installation is disconnected partially or totally from the bottom of the excavation site and the well is permanently sealed. The above activities are part of the life circle of an offshore oil reserve and are indicative of the size of the operations and the time required for their completion.

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B. The main market actors

19 Oil and gas exploration and production is to an extent a ‘closed circuit’. The market participants are limited and the market itself, although international has a certain structure that defies borders and political systems.

20 To begin with, drilling for oil and gas is an activity that requires considerable financial resources, with the cost of drilling being truly exorbitant especially offshore This, by definition, reduces significantly the number of undertakings that can enter the market. Furthermore, oil and gas operations are technically challenging. Every oil and gas reserve has different characteristics to address and difficulties to overcome. This, combined with the wide range of operations that have to be undertaken during the multiple stages of production as described above requires advanced technical know-how and highly specialized personnel. Finally, a strong state interest is expected in oil and gas operations. Apart from the developmental and political significance of oil for any sovereign state, the physical characteristics of the oil in situ (and especially the fact that the liquid reserves found underground can migrate across borders) require a certain level of political stability for the commencement and the continuation of the operations.

21 Because of all the above reasons, National Oil Companies (NOCs) have indisputably dominated the upstream oil and gas sector. NOCs are state-controlled oil companies that are not merely aiming to acquire more profit but are also preoccupied with energy strategy considerations (including energy security and independence, development of know-how etc). NOCs do not operate in strictly commercial terms

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and are willing to invest with a view to socioeconomic goals. Many States have opted for the creation of NOCs throughout the years (some of them with more success than others), including Greece, with the creation of the Public Oil Company (DEP/ΔΕΠ - Δημόσια Επιχείρηση Πετρελαίου) which eventually privatized and formed the Hellenic Petroleum Group back in the 1990s.

22 While NOCs are dominating the game of the numbers, with a titanium output of barrels of oil holding the majority share of the market, the private initiative scooped in to drive costs down and increase competition. International Oil Companies (IOCs) grew gradually to extensive corporate structures that operate in the four corners of the Earth and control to a large extent the production and distribution of oil. Their aggressiveness in seeking to maximize profit, their flexibility in making decisions and of course, the diversification of their portfolio in oil fields all over the world are balancing the lack of infinite resources.

23 In general, IOCs are considered more aggressive and technically capable, because they are competing with each other in a global market and are familiar with the necessity of taking risks. This creates incentives for cost control and heavy investment in new technologies. Furthermore, the engagement of an IOC in the production of oil, apart from the reduction of the cost and the risk of operations in a country serves as an affirmation that risk factors are low, therefore investment conditions are favourable and the economic and political situation relatively safe. This can attract further international investment. On the contrary, NOCs are often less effective, since profit is not a priority. NOCs might be supported by subsidies and in some cases, they are operating in a monopoly state-wide market. Furthermore, if public institutions are weak and decision-making is not well separated from the political scene, their governance might become part of the governmental policies. NOCs are also more prone to limit their activities within their country of origin which bears significant advantages yet bounds them to a regional operational centre.

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24 Despite the intense competition between the oil companies, collaboration is the rule and not the exception. The most obvious reason for that is the need to split the immense cost of operations and reduce the financial risks connected to the exploration of a specific field. By participating in more than one field around the globe, the risk of not finding commercially viable oil and gas reserves is sufficiently distributed through a varied portfolio. In addition to the economic aspect of sharing risks and costs, there are also many technical considerations in place. Some of those companies have been operating on the same continental shelf for decades and are therefore familiar with the peculiarities and the technical challenges it holds. In other cases, the extensive research and development undertaken by one of the companies has allowed it to acquire the particular technology that is needed for the extraction of hydrocarbons. Finally, sometimes, it is -implicitly- a matter of transferring know-how, especially between more experienced and newer players. To that end, upstream exploration companies are usually forming a consortium with the sole purpose of jointly bidding for a license from the state to engage in exploratory or production drilling operations in a pre-determined area under its jurisdiction. A license can be attributed to more than one company, and the joint bidders are called licensees, title holders or lessees. The relationship between those companies is regulated through a legal agreement called a joint operation agreement (JOA).

25 There are two distinct roles in this joint operation agreement: the operating and non-operating party. The operating party (commonly known as the operator’ is fully

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in charge of supervising the operations of the field and the interactions with the national authorities from the initial phase of the operation to the decommissioning of the installation and the sealing of the well. The operator is in principle the most able -both technically and financially- party to undertake the work required in the field and usually (although there are several exceptions to that rule) is the member of the consortium that possesses the majority of the interest in the joint venture. The role of the non-operating parties on the other hand can vary, depending on the agreement upon which they decided to collaborate and could range from merely providing capital to cover the cost of the operations to being involved in all major technical and strategic decisions.

26 There are also several other companies (that range from international service providers to small start-ups of a handful of specialized people) that cater for the needs of the operators. Those companies are called ‘contractors and they usually maintain the needed equipment and human capital to take over a specific part of the operation. The tasks attributed to contractors vary: from seismic surveying to drilling and well logging, from storage, transport and analysis of oil and gas to providing specialized divers or even cater the offshore workers of the installations with ships and/or helicopters.

C. Law of the Sea ramifications for offshore production

27 Conducting exploration and production in the outer limits of a state’s jurisdiction is introducing some complexities relating to the control of natural resources, the supervision of the operations and the state’s obligations to protect the marine environment. This was not as obvious in the dawn of the industry when exploration

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and production were taking place only a few meters away from the coast and the doctrine of territorial sovereignty was putting them unquestionably at the state’s disposal. As offshore installations started operating independently in increasingly greater depths, such questions began to arise. Most of those questions found answers through the extensive ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereby UNCLOS). UNCLOS has partly codified a set of pre-existing customary rules and has also introduced new notions to the International Law of the Sea, paving the way for a clear determination of sea borders and creating a fertile ground for further international legislative initiatives.

28 The UNCLOS is providing for the separation of the oceans of the world into six zones: the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the Continental Shelf, the High Seas and the Area. Those six zones are extending from the coast towards deeper waters, creating a concentric circle of gradually reducing power that moves away from the coast. Regarding the issue of control over the resources and supervision of operations, the power of the coastal states is established through the concept of sovereignty. More specifically:

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29 In the Territorial Sea, which can extend as far as 12 nautical miles from the coast’s baseline, the state’s sovereignty extends to the resources found in the sea subsoil. The Exclusive Economic Zone which is adjacent to the Territorial Sea cannot extend to more than 200 nautical miles from the baseline. In the EEZ, the coastal State has sovereign rights for exploring and exploiting natural resources from the seabed and the subsoil and the exclusive right to construct installations and artificial structures. Finally, the Continental Self comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea. The Continental Shelf can be defined as the natural prolongation of the coastal state’s land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin or can extent to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the established baseline. As opposed to those three zones, the rest of the UNCLOS’s zones are not attributing control over resources to any coastal state.

30 From the above it comes as no surprise that a clear delineation and delimitation of maritime borders is a sine-qua-non for the commencement of offshore operations. The insinuation that natural resources are available offshore is also a strong catalyst for the settlement of long territorial disputes and -in some cases- even for the

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establishment of joint development agreements. In that sense, the development of the Eastern Mediterranean basin after the delimitations of the maritime borders between Egypt and Cyprus and Israel and Cyprus came as a self-fulfilling prophecy.

31 While the control over the natural resources is a subject of conflict and tension, the protection of the environment, in the form of the precautionary principle has been affirmed in international law very early through both case and soft law instruments. UNCLOS is no exception to this rule and has a chapter dedicated entirely to the efforts of the states to protect and safeguard the environment. A specific obligation to pursue all marine offshore activities following the duty to protect and preserve the marine environment is set in articles 193 and 194(3). This obligation is further specified in Article 208, through which the coastal states are obliged to adopt regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution from offshore installations, taking into consideration international standards and aiming for harmonisation at a regional and global level.

32 From a legal point of view, it was an immense step forward to establish an obligation of the states to both prevent, reduce and control pollution of the maritime environment during offshore operations and also to ensure that pollution incidents do not affect a neighbouring state. Those provisions are introducing international liability for states that do not supervise adequately offshore operations, even though they do not introduce specific regulations to address transboundary pollution per se. Yet, aside from the general obligations introduced by UNCLOS and some

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regional agreements that are setting a general framework to facilitate international cooperation, the regulatory environment remains atrophic the industry is heavily self-regulated both at a national and an international level.

33 The reasons for this deregulation and light-hand supervision vary. The coastal state might not have the technical capacity or the will to design and enforce a regulatory framework that could effectively supervise the industry. Furthermore, in principle, states are very protective of activities connected to their energy resources and inherently hesitant to limit their sovereignty through international rules and conventions in any subject connected to the production of energy. This allows the industry to adopt a ‘double standard’ in the materials and the processes used in each jurisdiction, which can be significantly inferior to the internationally accepted standards. Those substandard practices might trigger the international liability of a state for a violation of the precautionary principle or even for a violation of human rights. In such cases, the existence of natural resources is more of a curse than a blessing while it becomes clear that countries that are underprepared when commencing the exploitation of their resources are bound to pay a price.

1.3 Oil pollution in the offshore sector

34 Taking into consideration all the above, it is evident that there are legal challenges in setting both national and international legislation for the prevention and restitution of offshore pollution. The extent of the operations, the number of market actors engaged in it, the complexity of the contractual relations developed and the ramifications of international law render oil pollution in the offshore sector a difficult issue at best.

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35 Undoubtfully, accidents offshore are part of the operations. Even the more experienced and mature oil and gas regions have had their fair share of accidents over the years. Some of them have taken a heavy toll on human lives (such as the Alexander Kielland or the Piper Alpha incidents). Some others have had significant environmental effects (such as the accidents in Santa Barbara and the explosion of IXTOC I in the Gulf of Mexico). Those accidents have led to re-evaluation and reconsideration of the frameworks across jurisdictions. There were only periodical efforts to introduce international legislation for offshore matters, and the most recent of those efforts was the outcome of two major accidents: the Montara accident taking place on the continental shelf of Australia and the Deepwater Horizon taking place offshore the United States of America at the Gulf of Mexico.

A. A wake-up call: Montara and Deepwater Horizon

36 On the 21st of August 2009, an incident occurred in the Timor Sea, where the Montara platform was undertaking exploratory drilling for the company PTTEP Australasia. There was an uncontrolled leakage of oil and gas that led to a fire on the Montara platform and the connected West Atlas platform. The platform’s personnel managed to escape, but for 74 days natural gas and oil had run uncontrollably into the Timor Sea, contaminating approximately 90,000 square kilometres of ocean. The actual volume of oil escaped from the field of mining remains unknown as well as the full range of environmental impacts it had in the marine area. Based

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on Australian law, the operator was responsible to bear the costs of the oil spill. The entity in question was PTTEP Australasia, which, according to the competent authority, had not complied with the practices approved by the government which would have been able to prevent the accident. An administrative fine was imposed to approximate $50 thousands of dollars, which was a ‘slap on the wrist’ compared to the full capacity of the Australian government to impose up to 1.8 million dollars in penalties and was partly attributed to the fact that the company committed to a clean-up of a total cost of 5 million dollars.

37 What made the case special was its transborder effects. Indonesia shares the waters of the Timor Sea with Australia and, despite expert reports provided by the oil and gas company claimed that the detergent used to clean the spill had caused a decrease in the population of the region’s fishing grounds and in particular the decline in the income of the fishermen on the island Rote, whose southern side was affected by the incident. The Government of Indonesia took legal action against PTTEP Australasia demanding reimbursement The company that was so eager to meet the Australian government’s clean-up costs (in whose territory and under whose authorisation the drilling was carried out), refused to recognize the merits of the Indonesian Government’s claim. Indonesia then turned against seeking compensation for inadequate supervision of the facility. When finally the case was settled with the agreement of partial restitution to the Indonesian government (and not directly to the fishermen) a partial indemnification (to the Indonesian state and not directly to the fishermen) was finally agreed upon more than nine years later In view of those events, Indonesia resorted to the most appropriate international body available: the International Maritime Organization (IMO), with the request to include on its agenda the drafting of an international treaty on civil liability for oil accidents resulting from oil pumping platforms. This effort did not bear fruits.

38 What was ultimately needed to mobilize not only the industry but also the international organizations was a ‘black swan incident’. A black swan incident is an event that deviated far beyond what was normally expected of a situation and was extremely difficult to predict. This was the case of the Deepwater Horizon accident in the Gulf of Mexico., The Deepwater Horizon platform was a mobile semi-submersible installation that have been subjected to multiple tests and was verified as safe to be operated. The owner of the platform was Transocean and the charter (and operator of the field) was BP, which together with Anadarko Petroleum Corporation and Mitsui Oil Exploration Company of Japan were the licensees of the

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field in the Gulf of Mexico. The platform, in the days before the fatal accident, was conducting exploratory drilling to determine the physiology and size of the Macondo field, situated offshore of Louisiana (and therefore licensed and supervised by the auspices of the United States of America).

39 On April 20th 2010, the platform proceeded to one of the final phases of the exploration process: the temporary abandonment and sealing of the well by Halliburton (the contractor that was hired for that task). The operations proceeded uneventfully and after the necessary tests had been carried out, the most unexpected thing happened: a high-pressure methane blast coming from the well surrounded the platform with natural gas. The safety valves that were installed specifically to prevent the occurrence of the accident (blowout preventers) did not function, and, as a result, a few minutes later a series of explosions followed, and the platform was wrapped in flames.

40 The accident’s report was tragic: eleven workers on the platform were killed during the explosion while several others were seriously injured. Two days after the incident, the platform itself sank. Despite the rapid reactions of both the US authorities and BP, efforts to seal the well lasted several months. The feat was achieved on the 15th of July 2010 and only on the 19th of September 2010 (five months after the unfortunate event) BP announced that the reserve was rendered inactive.

41 Between the occurrence of the accident and the sealing of the well, oil flowed uncontrollably in the Gulf of Mexico. BP has made some moderate calculations on the amount of oil that had spilt from the well, but more accurate federal government estimations support that 50,000 to 60,000 barrels of oil were leaking every day from the well, and the total amount of oil spill reached 4.8 million barrels of a spill and 180,000 square kilometres of polluted sea. It was an unimaginable

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environmental disaster and it is still not clear if the environment will ever return to its original condition.

Figure 2: A comparison of the most polluting oil accidents in the maritime and offshore industry (in barrels) according to worst-case scenarios

42 As expected, the destruction caused by the Deepwater Horizon lead to one of the largest and most complex court litigations of the century due to two contributing factors: The first was the extent of the damage: the oil spill had affected five US coastal states (Louisiana, Florida, Texas, Mississippi and Alabama) and part of Mexico’s coastline. The second was due to the oil pollution legislation in the US which, even though it was designed to ensure uniformity and effective satisfaction of claims, ‘crashed’ under the public outcry and the number of the claims. The fact that the offshore installation that caused the damage was mobile, and therefore maritime law applied complicated the case even further.

43 The result was a nightmare for the Federal American Courts, since multiple of the lawsuits were directed towards BP (which was the operator of the platform but also one of the licensees) as well as towards other contractors (MOEX and Adarko Petroleum), Transocean (the owner of the semi-submersible offshore unit) and Halliburton (the contractor who had sealed the well).

44 It soon became clear that the legal statute for pollution was neither adequate nor appropriate to deal with the size of that tragedy. In an effort to address the volume and complexity of the claims, BP, in cooperation with the United States government, set up a $ 20 billion fund ( called Gulf Coast Claims Facility) to facilitate

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the satisfaction of the existing claims. At the same time, mostly for reasons of publicity, BP forfeited the right to limit its liability as it had the right to do under federal legislation

45 The relations of the members of the joint venture were settled and all involved companies paid their share, but BP (being the operator) suffered the biggest financial hit, paying to the day, 65 billion dollars to cover all outstanding claims. Apart from clean-up costs and civil liability claims, all companies involved faced severe criminal and administrative penalties.

46 The accident caused in the Gulf of Mexico had a domino effect. The United States of America was a developed Western economy, at the forefront of many environmental initiatives that had years been supervising private oil and gas operators since 1930. If an accident of such magnitude could happen there, it could happen anywhere, and that inspired fear in the rest of the world. The industry invested heavily in research and development to develop technology that would prevent a similar accident to happen again, while the insurance sector struggled to provide cover for the newly realized magnitude of the risk Any suggestion to further relax state supervision of offshore activities in the USA was forgotten. Instead, a series of changes rendered the regulatory regime more austere. There was also significant pressure for the development of a more generous, easily accessible and effective system of civil liability.

47 Reactions were not limited to the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. The European States with offshore activities expected the results of the Independent Examining Committees that were investigating the reasons behind the accident. There were calls for a moratorium on offshore activities in European waters, but some of the Member States of the European Union took action on their own.

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